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DefendantsAppellant.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the evidence supports a finding of

conspiracy to defraud.
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2.

Whether the trial court erred by allowing the

matter to go to the jury and not granting a directed verdict
or judgment not withstanding the verdict in favor of the
Appellant.
3.

Whether the trial court erred in its

instructions to the jury, numbers 21, 26 and 27, wnere in
the burden for finding punitive damages was stated to be by
M

the preponderance" of the evidence.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Plaintiff brought an action against each o£

the Defendants on the theory that they conspired to defraud
him of his home.
On August 21-23, 1984, the Plaintiff's action
came on for trial before a jury in the Third Judicial
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, the Honorable J.
Dennis Fredrick presiding.

The jury returned a verdict in

favor of the Plaintiff and awarded both conpensatorv and
punitive damages.

After the verdict was returned, the

Appellant's motions for directed verdict and for judgment
notwithstandinq the verdict were considered resolved and
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therefore denied. T. 421. Subsecruently, the judgment entered
was appealed to this court.
Sometime prior to August 18, 1980, the Plaintiff
listed his property with Century 21~Harv Kirkpatrick for the
sales price of $44,000. T. 84. Dorius Black, through Scott
Peatross who was a real estate agent with Bill Brown Realty,
presented an offer to the Plaintiff and his real estate
agents, Vicki Phelps and Harv Kirkpatrick. T. 277. This
offer, presented by way of an Ernest Money Receipt and Offer
to Purchase,

provided for $20,000.00, including $1,000.00

earnest money, to be paid to the Plaintiff at closing with
the remaining $24,000 being deferred one year and paid over
a two year period. E.23. T. 278. After some negotiation, the
offer was accepted by the Plaintiff on July 30, 19R0.

Those

participating in the negotiations were the Plaintiff,
through his interpreter, Emilio Ortiz; the Plaintiff's
agents, Vicki Phelps and Harv Kirkpatrick; and Mr. Black and
his agent Scott Peatross. T. 282, 286.
Although Mr. Black negotiated the purchase of the
home, he never intended to actually buy the home himself. T.
19. During this time, he and Joseph Cannon had been involved
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in several business deals together.

Mr. Black looked for

business opportunities which, with the help of Mr. Cannon's
strong financial position, could be taken advantage of to
increase and strengthen their respective business interests.
T.19. Although not mentioning the Plaintiff by name, Mr.
Black represented to Mr. Cannon that he had a project that
would help him with his lease obligations to Alpha Leasing.
T. 104.

Mr. Cannon first met the Plaintiff at the time of

closing at the offices o? Stewart Title. T.87.
Also during this time, Mr. Black approached
Capitol Thrift and Loan (the Appellant) about receiving a
loan for the purchase of the home. T.21. The lender never
met the Plaintiff.

In fact, in making the loan, the lender

was not involved with the Plaintiff as seller. T. 138, 309.
As the value of the home appeared an acceptable risk for a
loan, the lender indicated money could be made available. T.
22. Other than providing the financing for the purchase of
the home, the lender was not a party to the plans of Mr.
Black and Mr. Cannon to purchase the home. T.50.
Subsequently, Mr. Cannon filled out an
application with the lender for a business loan to ourchase
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Plaintiff's property. T.120. Ex 34. Along with the
application, Mr. Cannon provided a personal financial
statement as well as a financial statement for Alpha Leasina
Company, a partnership in which Mr. Cannon held a
partnership interest T. 137 Ex. 35-36. An appraisal had
earlier been done on the home and was verified by Merlyn
Hanks, a loan officer for the lender. T. 137.

Based on the

value of the home and the financial strength of Mr. Cannon,
the lender agreed to extend $32,325.00 to Mr. Cannon for the
purchase of the home.
Accordingly, on August 1R, 19 3C, the day
appointed for closing, a check for that amount was delivered
to Stewart Title Company with instruction? on how and when
the check could be negotiated and disbursed. T. 139. Ex. 1.
Mr. Cannon denied endorsing the check, but did acknowledge
receiving the disbursements according to the instructions.
T. 101. The letter of instructions required that fee simole
title to the property be in the name of Joseph N. Cannon.
The letter of instuctions also provided that a Trust Deed in
favor of the Appellant be recorded as a first trust deed
subject to no other liens or incumbrances.

In addition,
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Stewart Title was instructed to disburse the funds as
follows: (1) $4348.75, to Capitol Thrift & Loan, (2) fees
for recording title and for an insurance policy and (3) the
remainder of the funds to Joseph N. Cannon or as he
directed.
Scott Peatross, with the Earnest Money Receipt and
Offer, contacted Tommy Sisk of Stewart Title and scheduled
August 18, 1980 as the time for closing.T. 216. The
Plaintiff along with his interpreter, Emilio Ortiz, Tommy
Sisk of Stewart Title Company, Scott Peatross of Bill Brown
Realty, Joseph Cannon, Dorius Black, and Jack Rhodes and
Vickie Phelps of Century 21-Harv Kirkpatrick were present.
T.194,106. Because o£ a delay, Mrs. Phelps left before the
closing actually took place and was replaced by Mr. Rhodes.
T.279,244.
The delay resulted from changes made at the
request of Mr. Black at the time of closing as to where
title would lie. T. 230,334.

Each of the parties were

explained the changes and were explained the documents
conveying title to Mr. Cannon. Each party accepted the
changes. T.229, 262, 320.

Such changes at the time of
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closing are usual in real estate transactions. T.230, 334.
In addition, the substitution of Mr. Cannon as title holder
complied with the provision of the Earnest Money Agreement
to determine the title holder at the time of conveyance.
217c

T.

Although Mr. Cannon maintained that he understood his

role in the transaction to be that of a guarantor, he
acknowledged signing the documents which clearly show the
contrary. T. 93-99. There was no dispute as to their legal
effect.
The closing statements indicated that the
$24,000.00 left owing was to be secured by a second deed of
trust.

Ex. 20 and 27. These documents were explained to the

Plaintiff and it was discussed that the total of the first
and second trust deeds would exceed the $44,000.00 sales
price, although the exact figure was not known at that time.
T. 213. The risk involved was explained to the Plaintiff by
Mr. Sisk as well as the Plaintiff's agents.

Although the

risk was explained, it was generally assumed by the
Plaintiff's agents that the first mortgage would not be an
amount above $20,000.

T. 251. Although this was assumed,

the only representation made was that the buyer would borrov;

-8-

the $20,000.00 needed for the down pavment. T. 250. There
was no limitation expressed in the Ernest Money Agreement or
otherwise. T. 249/ 287.
The note and Trust Deed in favor of the lender
were prepared at the lender's office. T. 242. Stewart Title
had nothing to do with the lender except as set forth in the
letter of instructions. Stewart Title, in fact had no prior'
conversations with anyone other than Scott Peatross who
scheduled the closing. T. 228. The documents along with the
check did not arrive until after the closincr had taken
place. T. 2C8.

Mr. Rhodes, the agent for the Plaintiff,

waited around to see that they arrived but left before
reviewing the documents. T. 264. There was no dispute as to
the legal effect of the documents executed by the parties.
Stewart Title proceeded according to the Ernest
Money Agreement it received and the letter of instructions by
recording a first Trust Deed in favor of the lender. T. 236.
There was no objection by the Plaintiff's real estate agents
to the Plaintiff's interest being secured by a second deed
of trust. T. 2^1.

In fact, an escrow account was set up to

handle the second trust deed in favor of the Plaintiff.

As
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part of the escrow instructions, the sellers representative
was listed as Leonor C. Pagan, the Plaintiff's daughter. T.
303. Ex. 16.
Complying with the lender's instructions to
protect its interest with a first trust deed, Stewart Title
proceeded to disburse the funds as required.

Each fee paid

by Stewart Title was normal and customary.
Having received the down payment, the Plaintiff
left for Puerto Rico where he was summoned back by his
interpreter, Emilio Ortiz, to instigate this lawsuit.

The

Plaintiff, having received a serious head injury from an
industrial accident, was described as being of "low normal
range" of intelligence. T. 66.

Plaintiff's mental capacity

is difficult to determine unless tested. T. 75.

The

Plaintiff was able to reach a settlement with Kennecott over
his injury and to buy the home which is the subiect of the
current action. T. 77. The Plaintiff had difficulty
understanding English and was assisted in all aspects of the
transaction by Emilio Ortiz, his interpreter.

Everyone,

including the Plaintiff's agents, felt and assumed that the
Plaintiff understood and was competent to understand the

-10-

transaction he consumated. T. 267, 282, 374.
The loan to Mr. Cannon for the purchase of the
home was made when Mr. Cannon was in qood financial
condition. T. 386, 389,39 4.

The terms of the loan provided

for five installments with a balloon payment for the full
amount due in six months. T. 14 5. Such terms were customary
for the type oE lender the Aopellant was and for the time
the loan was made. T. 161, 392. The note subsequently came
into default.
Notice of default was mailed and Mr. Cannon asked
for and received a couple of extensions. T. 163.
payments were paid on the loan.

Some

However, the defaults

continued and the property ultimately was foreclosed, with a
deficiency being sought against Mr. Cannon. T. 166.
With the foreclosure of the home, the Plaintiff
brought this action.

Although alleging a cause of action

against the Appellant in his complaint, the Plaintiff
testified that he did not claim a cause of action against
the Appellant. T. 274.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The jury's finding that the Appellant conspired to
defraud the Plaintiff is not supported by the direct
evidence or by circumstantial evidence which can be
reasonably and naturally inferred.

The verdict is based

solely on suspicion and on symoathy for the Plaintiff.

The

jury instructions on punitive damages introduced a
conflicting standard of proof which was confusing and
prejudicial to the ultimate finding of the underlying cause
of action.
ARGUMENT
1
Trit, VbKDICT WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE
EVIDENCE
The standard of review of a jury verdict has been
stated by the court recently as follows:
It is the exclusive province of a jury
to determine the credibility of the
witnesses, weigh the evidence, and make
findings of fact. (citation omitted).
Where the evidence is conflicting and
the jury is properly instructed, we do
not upset those findings of fact except
upon a showing that the evidence, viewed
in the light most favorable to the
verdict so clearly preponderated in
Appellant's favor that reasonable
persons could not differ on the outcome
of the case.
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Groen vs. Tri-O-Inc.yUtah, 667 P. 2d 598 (1983).

See also

£.A. Strout Western Realty vs. W. C. Foy & Sons,Utah, 66 5
P. 2d 1320 (1983).
The jury in the instant case found by special
verdict that the lender, the Title Company and Joseph Cannon
engaged in a civil conspiracy to defraud the Plaintiff of
his home.

To determine whether the evidence preponderated

in lender's favor to where reasonable minds would not
differ, requires that civil conspiracy and fraud be defined.

A civil conspiracy has been defined as a
combination of two or more persons by concerted action to
accomplish an unlawful purpose, or to accomplish some
purpose not in itself unlawful by unlawful means. ISA C.J.S.
Conspiracy § 1 (1). In general, to constitute civil
conspiracy there must be the following elements:
(1) Two or more persons, and for this
purpose a corporation is a person; (2)
an object to be accomplished; (3) a
meeting of minds on object or course of
action; (4) one or more unlawful overt
acts; and (5) damages as the proximate
result thereof.
ISA C.J.S. Conspiracy § 1 (2).
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The Utah Supreme Court, in Crane Co, v. Dahle,
Utah, 576 P 2d 870 (1978), set forth the elements as (1)
wrongfully conspiring to violate the Plaintiff rights, (2)
the carrying out of such plan; and (3) damages proximately
caused thereby.

The court further stated that the Plaintiff

has the burden of proving civil conspiracy by clear and
convincing evidence. Crane Co. at 872.
Fraud is defined by the court In Taylor v. Gasor
Inc., Utah, 607 P 2d 29 3 (1980), as follows:
. . . the making of a false
reoresentation concernina a presently
existing material fact which the
representor either knew to be false or
made recklessly without sufficient
knowledge, or the ommission of a
material fact when there is a duty to
disclose, for the purpose of inducinq
action on the part of the other party,
with actual, justifiable reliance
resulting in damage to that party.
As with civil conspiracy, the court held that a
finding of fraud must be shown by clear and convincing proof
and will not lie in mere suspicion or innuendo.
Furthermore, a person cannot be liable for fraud unless he
made the representation himself, authorized someone to make
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it for him or participated in some way such as through
conspiracy.

37 C.J.S. Fraud §61.

In the present case, there is no direct evidence
showing the Appellant misrepresented a material fact known
to be false.

There is no direct evidence showing that the

lender acted for the purpose of inducing the Plaintiff to
sell his home or that the Plaintiff justifiably relied upon
the lender's actions.

Since the lender did not, by its own

actions, defraud the Plaintiff or authorize another, the
lender's liability can only be established through some
participation in a fraud such as in a civil consoiracy.
The facts established by the Plaintiff don't
support the allegation of a civil conspiracy.

Ihe lender's

acts were lawful and were conducted for a lawful purpose.
The evidence showed that, other than providing the
financing, the lender did not participate in the plan of Mr.
Black to purchase the Plaintiff's home.

There were no

misrepresentations or omissions shown to have been made by
Mr. Cannon through Mr. Black or by Mr. Sisk.

The asumptions

of the Plaintiffs agents were never expressed nor made known
to the parties. Because of this, the jury's finding of

-15-

conspiracy to defraud can only rest on inferences drawn from
the facts proven.
The Appellant recoanizes that inferences play an
important role in any findings of fact, especially in cases
such as this.

Inferences, however, must be reasonably and

legitimately drawn.
fraud.

This is particularly so in cases of

See 37 C.J. S. Fraud § 115.

Inferences must be made

for the purpose of aidina reason and not to override it.
They are nothing more than the probable and natural
explanation of the facts. Holland vs. Columbia Mining
Co.,4 Utah 2d 303, 29 3 P?d 700 (1956).
In Holland, the court was faced with an appeal
of a ruling on Summary Judgment that there was not a
fraudulent conspiracy in the business transactions between
the parties. After addressing the issue of inferences, the
court stated the following:
Common sense and reason dictate that
evil inferences should not be permitted
to be drawn from routine business
transactions where there are no other
circumstances. To hold otherwise would
throw the door open for attack on each
and every transaction that one might
enter into.
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In the present case, the inferences were not
reasonably and legitimately drawn.

The result reached by

the jury is not probable nor a natural explanation of the
facts proven.

This conclusion is supported by the following

reasons.
1.

The lender had been in contact with Mr. Black,

Mr. Cannon and Mr. Sisk.
contacts.

These were purely business

Mr. Black inquired of the availability of a loan

to purchase the Plaintiff's home.

A loan was extended to

Mr. Cannon on the basis of the application and financial
statements which he had filled out.

Contact with Mr. Sisk

occurred when the loan and letter of instructions were
delivered to Stewart Title on the day of the closing.

While

the lender's contacts with Mr. Black and Mr. Cannon were
before the date of closing, those contacts were after Mr.
Black had negotiated for the purchase of Plaintiff's home.
Mr. Black testified that the lender was not involved with
his and Mr. Cannon's plans for the purchase of the home.
These contacts are not enouqh to infer fraud.
2.

The lender had dealt with Mr. Black before.

This fact explains the reason for the referral of Mr. Cannon

-17-

for the loan*

The success of a business depends to a large

degree on the returning customer*

Evil inferences here are

improper.

3.

The lender loaned Mr. Cannon $32,325.00 for

the purchase of Plaintiff's property.

The Plaintiff's

agents felt that this was a substantial deviation of the
Plaintiff's agreement. Even if it were a deviation, the
lender had no way of knowing of the deviation.

There was no

limitation of the amount to be borrowed put into writing in
the agreement as should have been done by Plaintiff's
agents. Furthermore, there was no representation to the
Plaintiff that the amount borrowed on the property would be
limited.

Any "deviation" resulted from a misunderstanding

between buyer and seller. The only representation mede was
that the $20,000.00 down payment would have to be borrowed.
The lender was never notified of any limitation whatsoever
on the property.

It's loan was based on representations

made on Mr. Cannon's application and on the value of the
security.

The lender acted

simply are unreasonable.

lawfully.

Other inferences
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4.

The letter of instructions which accompanied

the loan check to Stewart Title required that fee simole
title be in the name of Joseph N. Cannon and that the lender
be secured by a first trust deed.

This requirement does not

indicate that the lender was trying to cheat the Plaintiff
out of his property, but rather to protect its interests in
the property which was being used as security for the loan
which was made.
industry.

Such practice is usual in the banking

The inference of fraud is an unnatural

explanation of the facts.
5.

The letter of instructions also required

$4,848.75 to be paid back to the lender.

This fact is

perhaps the only fact where an evil inference could be
drawn.

However, even here there is a more reasonable and

natural explanation.

It was testified that finders fees

were paid for loans which resulted from referrals.

It was

testified that it was probable that this amount was paid as
a finders fee to Mr. Black and was credited against
obligations he owed to the lender. The amount was paid by
Alpha Leasing at the direction of Mr. Cannon whose business
dealings with Mr. Black in no way involved the lender.
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6.

The Plaintiff was of low intelligence.

Plaintiff's doctor testified that this fact could only be
determined through testing.

All those who had dealt with

the Plaintiff, including his own real estate agents, felt
that the Plaintiff understood and was competent to enter
into the subject transaction. Even if the Plaintiff's mental
capacity could be determined by observation, the lender
could not have known since it never met nor was involved
with the Plaintiff.
7.

Evil inferences here are improper.

Certain sums were deducted from the

Plaintiff's down payment and paid to the real estate agents
and Stewart Title.

These amounts were explained by Stewart

Title and testified as being the usual and customary
practice of the real estate business. There was nothing
improper here to infer the jury's finding.
8.

At the time of closing, Mr. Cannon was

substituted as buyer.

This substitution is clear on the

documents and was done according to the express provision of
Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase. This fact was
also explained to each party.

The lender had nothing to do
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with the change other than lending the money to Mr. Cannon
as the buyer.
9. The Plaintiff was not made aware of the changes
made at the time of closing.

The evidence shows that the

documents clearly indicated that Mr. Cannon was the buyer
and that the remaining obligation owed to the Plaintiff: was
secured bv a second trust deed.

The legal effect of the

documents executed by the parties was not disputed.
Discussions were held between the Plaintiff and Mr. Sisk and
Mr. Rhodes, the agent for the Plaintiff, concerning the risk
involved in such a transaction.

The evidence

shows that

an explanation or at least an opportunity to be explained
existed but that the Plaintiff simply did not understand.
This is underscored by the escrow documents which listed
Plaintiff's daughter as representative.

Although there mav

have been misunderstanding, information was in fact going
back and forth.
10.

The trust deed in favor of the lender was

drafted ana signed outside of the Plaintiff's presence.
This was the usual practice in that the transaction between
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Mr. Cannon and tne lender was a separate transaction from
that between Mr. Cannon and the Plaintiff.
11.

The funds received from the lender were

disbursed after the closing had taken place.
testified to as being the usual practice.

This was

There was no

objection indicated by the Plaintiff or his agents.

In

fact, Mr. Rhodes waited around until the check arrived from
the lender but did not take the time to review the
documentation.
12.
months.

The loan to Mr. Cannon was payable in six

This type of loan was not unusual for the type of

lending institution that the Appellant wa? and for the time
that the loan was made. Mr. Cannon testified that at the
time the loan was made, he could financially meet the terms.
A foreclosure sale did not immediately follow the defaults
as Mr. Cannon was allowed to extend the loan.

The Appellant

did not agree to extend the loan with the thought of
immediately foreclosing Plaintiff's interest in the
property.
loan.

Some payments were made by Mr. Cannon on the
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The only inference which can reasonably be drawn
from these facts is that the lender was used by Mr. Black
and Mr. Cannon to fund part of: their business ventures which
ultimately soured. Any other finding simply is not
reasonable based on the evidence.

This is particularly so

given the fact that the Plaintiff himself testified that he
did not have a cause of action against the Appellant.

The

evil inferences drawn by the jury are at most suspicion and
suspicion is not enough to support an inference of fraud.
One may only assume that they used the "deep pocket" theory
in their judgment. Even at that, the suspicions do not
reasonably and naturally follow the facts proven.

The

verdict rendered by the jury clearly was an act of sympathy
for the Plaintiff who was continuously described as being
physically and mentally impaired and who did net understand
the english language.

While sympathy may be warranted for

the Plaintiff, the verdict is not.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WhEN IT DENIED ThE
MOTIONS FOR DIRECTED VERDICT AND FOR
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING VERDICT.
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The Appellant recognizes that the right of trial
by jury is one which should be safeguarded by the courts.
There are, however, circumstances where the issues of fact
should be taken from the jury.

This Court has set forth

those circumstances as follows.
. . . In ruling on motions which take
issues of fact from the jury (this
includes both motions for directed
verdict and judgment notwithstanding the
verdict), the trial court if obligated
to look at the evidence and all
reasonable inferences that fairly may be
drawn therefrom in the light favorable
to the party moved against? and the
granting of such a motion is justified
only if, in so viewing the evidence,
there is no substantial basis therein
which would support a verdict in his
favor.
Mel Hardman Prod. Inc. vs. Robinson, Utah, 604 P 2d 913,
(1979). Management Committee, Etc. vs. Graystone Pines,
Utah, 652 P 2d 896 (1982) .
In the present case, the evidence was not
sufficient for the reasons argued above.

As a result, the

Plaintiff failed to establish his prima facie case against
the Appellant.

The elements of both fraud and conspiracy

were not established by evidence which was clear and
convincing.

Therefore, as a matter of law, there could not
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be a finding of conspiracy to defraud the Plaintiff and his
cause of action must fail.

This result is underscored by

the fact that the Plaintiff, under oathf testified that he
did not make any claim against the Appellant,

This case

should not have been allowed to go before the jury . The
trial court was incorrect when it ruled that the Appellant's
motions to take the case from the jury were resolved by the
return of the jury's verdict.

i--: jury's verdict does not

change Plaintiff's testimony or the lack cE a prima facie
case.
II£
THE COURT ERRED lis INSTRUCTING THE JURY
ThAT PUMTIVb DAMAGES CAN BE FOUL\D ON A
DIFFERENT STANDARD OF PROOF ThAN THE
UNDERLYING OiRONGbUL ACT COMPLAINED OF.
Punitive damages are awarded only where the nature
of the wrong complained of goes beyond merely violating the
rights of another.

For an award of punitive damages to be

proper, the wrongful act complained of must be characterized
by some circumstance of aggravation such as conduct which is
willful, malicious or in knowing or reckless disregard for
the rights of others. Behrens v. Raleigh Hills hospital
Inc.,Utah, 675 P2d 1179 (1983).Leigh Furniture & Carpet
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Co. vs. Isom,Utah, 675 P2d 29 3 (1982). 72 Am. Jur. 2d
damages § 246.
Even in cases of fraud. Punitive damages are the
exception. The basic elements of fraud, as indicated above,
must be established by clear and convincing evidence and not
by mere susicipion or innuendo.

Punitive damages may be

awarded in such cases of fraud where there is, in addition
to the basic elements of fraud, "other extraordinary or
exceptional circumstances clearlv indicatino malice or
willfulness."

37 C.J.S. Fraud §144 (emohases added).

In the present case, the trial court instructed
the jury in instructions Nos. 21, 26, and 27 that punitive
damages could be found from a preponderance of the evidence
that the Defendant's conduct was willful and malicious in
conspiring to defraud the Plaintiff.

Since punitive damages

are the exception, even in cases of fraud, the basis for the
award must be found in additional facts above and beyond the
elements of the underlying wrongful act. Because of this,
the standard of proof for the findings upon which the award
of punitive damages is based must coincide with the standard
of proof necessary for a finding of the underlying wrongful
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act.

In this case, the underlying wrongful act is

conspiracy to defraud which must be found by clear and
convincing evidence. The court's use of the preponderance
standard in this instance was at the least, confusing to the
jury and, at most, prejudicial in the jury's awardinq
compensatory damaaes on the Plaintiff's cause of action.
CONCLUSION
The jury verdict awarding the Plaintiff
compensatory and punitive damages must be reversed.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 12th day of March,
1985.
JENSEN & LEWIS, P.C.

"OLSEN
Attorneys for Appellant
MAILING CERTIFICATE

/V £JJW*J

I hereby certify that a true and Correct copy of
the foregoing Appellant's Brief was mailed, postage prepaid,
to Mark S. Miner, 525 Newhcuse Building, 10 Exchange Place,
Salt Lake City, Utah

84111 this 12^

day of March, 1985.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ISRAEL PAGAN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JOSEPH N. CANNON, DORIUS
BLACK, ALPHA LEASING
COMPANY, a partnership,
ROBERTG D. APGOOD, JOSEPH
N. CANNON, DORIUS BLACK
and RICHARD McKEAN doing
business under the name and
style of Alpha Leasing
Company, BILL BROWN REALTY,
INCORPORATED, SCOTT PEATROSS,
individually, STEWART TITLE
COMPANY OF UTAH, TOMMY W.
SISK, CAPITOL THRIFT &
LOAN, a financial
corporation, BACKMAN
TITLE COMPANY, a financial
corporation, and MERLYN
HANKS,

SPECIAL VERDICT

Civil No. C-82-5710
JUDGE FREDERICK

Defendants.
We, the jury in the above case, find the following:
1. Did Capitol Thrift & Loan Company, through its
agent, Merlyn Hanks, by clear and convincing evidence engage
in a civil conspiracy to defraud plaintiff incident to the
transaction in question?

Yes

X.
N

No

2. Did Stewart Title Company of Utah, through its
agent, Tommy W. Sisk, by clear and convincing evidence engage
in a civil conspiracy to defraud plaintiff incident to the
transaction in question?
Yes

No

- 2 -

3. Was Scott Peatross, at the time in question,
an agent of Bill Brown Realty, Inc.?

Yes

No&

4. If you answered No. 3 above "yes", then answer
this question:
Did Bill Brown Realty, Inc., through its agent,
Scott Peatross, by clear and convincing evidence engage in a
civil conspiracy to defraud plaintiff incident to the transaction
in question?
Yes

No

5. If you answered No. 3 above "no", then answer
this question:
Did Scott Peatross, individually, by clear and
convincing evidence, engage in a civil conspiracy to defraud
plaintiff incident to the transaction in question?

Yes

-^r

6. Was Joseph Cannon, at the time in question,
an agent of Alpha Leasing Company?

Yes

x

No

7. If you answered No. 5 above "yes", then answer
this question:
Did Alpha Leasing Company, through its agent,
Joseph Cannon, by clear and convincing evidence engage in a
civil conspiracy to defraud plaintiff incident to the transaction in question?

Yes

No
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8. If you answered No* #?above "no", then answer
tnis question:
Did Joseph Cannon, individually, by clear and
convincing evidence, engage in a civil conspiracy to defraud
plaintiff incident to the transaction in question?

Yes

x
N

No

9. Was Richard McKean, at the time in question,
an agent of Alpha Leasing Company?

Yes

x
x

No

10. If you answered No. 7 above "yes", then answer
this question:
Did Alpha Leasing Company, through its agent,
Richard McKean, by clear and convincing evidence engage in a
civil conspiracy to defraud plaintiff incident to the transaction in question?

ac

Yes

No

11. If you found by clear and convincing evidence
that Capitol Thrift & Loan Company, through its agent, Merlyn
Hanks, engaged in a civil conspiracy to defraud the plaintiff
incident to the transaction in question, what damage, if any, do
you find was caused to the plaintiff:
Compensatory

$

Punitive

$

/ACTO

(not to exceed $24,000.00)

Lfp-e1^) ^

12. If you found by clear and convincing evidence
that Stewart Title Company of Utah, through its agent, Tommy
Sisk, engaged in a civil conspiracy to defraud the plaintiff
incident to the transaction in question, what damage, if any, do
you find was caused to the plaintiff:
Compensatory

$

Punitive

$

(not to exceed $24,000.00)
^ ^ V

7

*
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13. If you found by clear and convincing evidence that
Bill Brown Realty, Inc., through its agent, Scott Peatross,
engaged in a civil conspiracy to defraud the plaintiff incident
to the transaction in question, what damage, if any, do you find
was caused to the plaintiff:
Compensatory

$

Punitive

$

t

'

(not to exceed $24,000.00)

14. If you found by clear and convincing evidence that
Scott Peatross, individually, engaged in a civil conspiracy to
defraud the plaintiff incident to the transaction in question,
what damage, if any, do you find was caused to the plaintiff:
Compensatory

$

Punitive

$

—

(not to exceed $24,000.00)

15. If you found by clear and convincing evidence
that Alpha Leasing Company, through its agent, Joseph Cannon,
engaged in a civil conspiracy to defraud the plaintiff incident
to the transaction in question, what damage, if any, do you find
was caused to the plaintiff:
Compensatory

$

•—r^

Punitive

$

*

(not to exceed $24,000.00)

""~

16. If you found by clear and convincing evidence
that Joseph Cannon, individually, engaged in a civil conspiracy
to defraud the plaintiff incident to the transaction in question,
what damaqe, if any, do you find was caused to the plaintiff:
Compensatory

$

/ 3^ C-F~f"

Punitive

$

if Q € H °

(not to exceed $24,000.00)

17. If you found by clear and convincing evidence
that Alpha Leasing Company, through its agent, Richard McKean,
engaged in a civil conspiracy to defraud the plaintiff incident
to the transaction in question, what damage, if any, do you find
was caused to the plaintiff:
Compensatory*- $
Punitive

$

-

(not to exceed $24,000.00)
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18. If you found by clear and convincing evidence
that Richard McKean, individually, engaged in a civil conspiracy
to defraud the plaintiff incident to the transaction in question,
wnat damage, if any, do you find was caused to the plaintiff:
Compensatory

$

Punitive

$

DATED this

£L L/

-

(not to exceed $24,000.00)

day of August, 1984.

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ISRAEL PAGAN
Plaintiff,
JUDGMENT ON JURY VERDICT
Civil No. C-82-5710

vs.
JOSEPH N. CANNON, DORIUS
BLACK, ALPHA LEASING COMPANY,
a partnership, ROBERT D.
APGOOD, JOSEPH N. CANNON,
DORIUS BLACK, and RICHARD
McKEAN, doing business under
the name and style of ALPHA
LEASING COMPANY, BILL BROWN
REALTY, INCORPORATED, SCOTT
PEATROSS, personally, STEWART
TITLE COMPANY OF UTAH, TOMMY
W. SISK, CAPITOL THRIFT AND
LOAN, a financial corporation;
BACKMAN TITLE COMPANY, a
financial corporation, and
MERLYN HANKS,

Judge J. Dennis Frederick

Defendants.

The above entitled matter came on regularly for trial
before the Court sitting with a jury on August 21-24, 1984, the
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, District Judge, presiding.

The

plaintiff, ISRAEL PAGAN, was represented by his counsel, Mark
S. Miner.

The defendants JOSEPH N. CANNON, ALPHA LEASING

COMPANY, a partnership, and RICHARD McKEAN were represented by

their counsel, Richard N. Cannon.

BILL BROWN REALTY,

INCORPORATED, and SCOTT PEATROSS were represented by their
counsel, Duane A. Burnett.

STEWART TITLE COMPANY OF UTAH and

TOMMIE W. SISK were represented by their counsel, Robert D.
Merrill-

CAPITOL THRIFT AND LOAN and MERLYN HANKS were

represented by their counsel, Kay M. Lewis.

ROBERT D. APGOOD

was represented by his counsel, Richard I. Ashton and Thomas Rc
Vuksinick.

The defendant DORIUS BLACK, having not been duly

served with summons and complaint in this matter, did not
appear other than as a witness and did not otherwise
participate in the trial.
At the conclusion of the presentation of the evidence,
it was stipulated by, between and among the parties that the
complaint could be dismissed with prejudice as against the
defendants ROBERT D. APGOOD, TOMMIE W. SISK and MERLYN HANKS.
With respect to plaintiff's remaining claims against
the defendants, the jury answered special interrogatories and
rendered its verdict on August 24, 1984.

Following the

announcement of the verdict, the Court heard and duly
considered various motions by the defendants for the entry of
judgments notwithstanding the verdict and the Court having
determined and ruled that said motions should be denied, it is
therefore,
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
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1.

Plaintiff's complaint against the defendants

ROBERT D. APGOOD, TOMMIE W. SISK and MERLYN HANKS be and the
same is hereby dismissed with prejudice, no cause of action.
2.

Plaintiff's complaint against the defendants BILL

BROWN REALTY, INCORPORATED, SCOTT PEATROSS and ALPHA LEASING
COMPANY be and it is hereby dismissed with prejudice, no cause
of action,
3.

Plaintiff is awarded judgment against CAPITOL

THRIFT AND LOAN in the amount of $12,000.00 compensatory
damages, and $4,000.00 punitive damages.
4.

Plaintiff is awarded judgment against the

defendant STEWART TITLE COMPANY OF UTAH in the amount of no
compensatory damages and $2,000.00 punitive damages.
5.

Plaintiff is awarded judgment against the

defendant JOSEPH N. CANNON in the amount of $12,000.00
compensatory damages, and $4,000.00 punitive damages.
MADE AND ENTERED this

day of

BY THE COURT:

J. Dennis Frederick
District Judge
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, 1984.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
SERVED the foregoing Judgment on Verdict by mailing a
copy thereof, postage prepaid, to the following this
of August, 1984:

Duane A* Burnett, Esq.
Attorney for Bill Brown
Realty and Scott
Peatross
P. 0. Box 27
Bountiful, Utah 84010

Kay M. Lewis, Esq.
Attorneys for
Capitol Thrift and Loan
and Merlyn Hanks
320 So. 300 East, Suite 1
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Mark S. Miner, Esq0
Attorney for Plaintiff
525 Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Richard No Cannon, Esq.
Attorney for Joseph N0 Cannon
431 South 300 East
Suite 106
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Richard I. Ashton, Esq. and
Thomas R. Vuksinick, Esq.
57 West 200 South,
Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Dorius Black
Cascade Drive
Morgan, Utah 84050

YA-A^JC>
Robert D. Merrill
5953M
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day

Under the law, it does not necessarily follow from a
finding that one member of a partnership is liable for punitive
damages that any or all of other members of the partnership are
also liable for punitive damages.

The acts or omissions of one

partner will justify an award of punitive damages against
another partner or partners if and only if those acts or
omissions are within the ordinary course and scope of partnership business and the other partner or partners against
punitive damages are awarded authroized, participated in, or
ratified those acts or omissions•
If you find that the acts or omissions of Joseph N. Cannoi
justify an award of punitive damages against him, punitive
damages may be awarded agains the other partners of Alpha Leasing if, and only if, you find by the
preponderance of the
le pr<
evidence each of the following elements:
1.

That at the time of the events at which this
lawsuit occurred Joseph N. Cannon was acting as a
partner of Alpha Leasing Company;

2.

That the acts of Joseph N. Cannon were within the
ordinary course and scope of Alpha Leasing's business;

3.

That each of the partners against whom punitive
damages are awarded sought, authorized, participated
in, or ratified the acts or omissions of Joseph
N. Cannon.

INSTRUCTION NO •

^

In addition to the actual damages plaintiff alleges
he has sustianed, he also seeks to recover punitive or exemplary
damages against the defendants.

If you find the issues in

favor of the plaintiff and that he is entitled to recover
actual damages, you may also consider whether the plaintiff
is entitled to such punitive damages.
Before punitive damages may be awarded, you must find
the issues in favor of the plaintiff and against the individual
defendants, and further you must find f orm >arpreponderance of%
the evidence that the individual defendantsf conduct in injuring
the plaintiff was willfull and malicious.

If 'you so find,

you may award, if you deem it proper to do so, such sum as
in your judgment would be reasonable and proper as a punishment to that defendant for such wrongs, and as a wholesome
warning to others not to offend in like manner.
punitive damages are given, you should

If such

award them with

caution and you should keep in mind that they are only for the
purpose just mentioned and are not the measure of actual damage.
Such damages must not exceed the amount prayed for by the
plaintiff.

JURY INSTRUCTION NO.

J?*?

If you find that plaintiff suffered damage as a proximate result of the conduct of any of the defendants on which
you base a finding of liability, you may then consider whether
you should award punitive or exemplary damages against such
defendant for the sake of example and by way of punishment*
You may in your discretion award such damages, if, but cr.Iy
if, you find^y a preponderance "of the evidence that said
defendant's acts were wilful or malicious in the conduce en
which you base your finding of liability.
In arriving at any award of punitive damagesf you
are to consider the following:
1. The reprehensibility of the conduct of the defendant.
2.

The amount of punitive damages which will have a

deterrent effect on the defendant.
3. That the punitive damages must bear a reasonable
relation to the actual damages.
/
j

